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Romanos IV Diogenes

Συγγραφή : Markouris Yannis (10/11/2002)
Μετάφραση : Loumakis Spyridon

Για παραπομπή: Markouris Yannis, "Romanos IV Diogenes",
Εγκυκλοπαίδεια Μείζονος Ελληνισμού, Μ. Ασία
URL: <http://www.ehw.gr/l.aspx?id=9121>
Ρωμανός Δ΄ Διογένης (20/12/2009 v.1) Romanos IV Diogenes (15/2/2006 v.1) 
 

1. Descent and career

Romanos Diogenes was born around 1025, probably in Cappadocia, where his family’s birthplace lay and where he owned estates. He was son of Constantine Diogenes, a prominent military officer under Basil II (976-1025), and of a niece of later emperor Romanos Argyros (1028-1034).1 His father had been arrested complotting against Romanos III Argyros and was forced to suicide. As far as his mother concerns, Byzantine authors do not mention any information. From his marriage with Anna, daughter of strategos Alousianos of Bulgarian stock, Romanos had a son named Constantine, while from his second marriage two sons, Nikephoros and Leo. According to some sources, he was a relative of later emperor Nikephoros Botaneiates.

Romanos made his career in the army under emperor Constantine X Doukas (1059-1067) and rose in eminence during various battles against the Hungarians and the Pechenegs who invaded Danubian provinces of the state. His success on the battlefield and the bravery he showed against every enemy attack won him his appointment as commander-in-chief of the armies along the northern frontiers (under the title of doukas or katepano), centered in Serdica, an event that made him known within military cycles in the capital. At the same time, he was honored by the emperor with the title of vestarches.2

In 1067, after Constantine X’s death, Romanos tried to gain over the Hungarians, aiming at seizing power. However the conspiracy was unveiled and he was captured and driven in chains to the capital, in order to stand trial on a charge of sedition.3 At the imperial court presided the widow of Constantine X, augusta Eudokia Makrembolitissa, regent of her minor heirs to the throne. Instead of condemning the rebellion to death, augusta exiled him in Cappadocia.4

2. Romanos Diogenes emperor

2.1. Ascent to the throne

On Christmas 1067, Eudokia recalled Romanos Diogenes from his exile, to whom she bestowed the title of magistros. Her end was to marry him and entrust him with the mission to confront the Seljuk menace. The situation in the eastern frontier was so tragic, due to the continuous raids and loots of the Turks, that the new emperor should be a competent general.

However, empress’ plans were against her written oath through which Constantine X had demanded from her personally and the Senate that they would protect and act as regents of his minor children, until the elder one would attain his majority and take over the throne. In addition, the senate committed itself that it would acknowledge as legitimate heirs only Constantine’s scions.5 This written commitment lay at the hands of patriarch of Constantinople John Xiphilinos, yet augusta resorted to a stratagem in order to break patriarch’s resistance: she made him believe that she was planning to marry his nephew, Bardas, so Xiphilinos arranged right away the annulment of the oath. Free from her commitment, on the 1st of January 1068 Eudokia moved on to her marriage with Diogenes, proclaiming him at the same time emperor.6

Romanos IV was summoned to come upon difficult and perplexed situations, externally because of the raids of the Seljuks, whom the Byzantine army could not confront with efficiency, as well internally: although he reigned together with Constantine X’s sons, Romanos had to deal with the reactions of the Doukas family, who, with caesarJohn Doukas, brother of the late emperor, in charge, continuously undermined his efforts. The reason behind this opposition lay on the fear of the Doukai in case Romanos would found a new dynasty, superseding the legitimate heirs of Constantine X.

Of primary concern for the new emperor was to reorganize the army and make the state machine ready for war, a task quite difficult by nature and even more because of the reaction of the Doukai. Romanos was forced to rely on foreign mercenaries (Latin/Franks and Turkomans), at least until he could raise an efficient Byzantine army. This solution, however, was not a satisfying one, since foreign mercenaries created in turn problems concerning the cohesion of the army. Furthermore, Romanos himself, although brave and experienced, did not possess the necessary military education and the commanding knowledge for the organization of wide-scale operations in a wide range of terrains, as it appears from the three campaigns he made. Especially the undertaking of the first two campaigns (1068, 1069) testifies the lack of planning, the ignorance of the condition of the road system, of the weather conditions and their side-effects upon the course of the military operations.7

Outside the military mistakes, Romanos committed political mistakes as well, proven fatal for his own power. One of them was that he kept in court Michael Psellos, John Doukas and their followers, who opposed him openly or in a tricky way and contributed to his fall. In addition, after his ascent to the throne, he proclaimed co-emperors the three sons of Constantine X. However, after having two sons with Eudokia, he proclaimed them co-emperors as well. Thus, the empire was governed by Diogenes, Eudokia and five co-emperors, a sign of the political instability that dominated inside the state. Finally, financial needs created by Romanos’ continued military operations forced him to debase once more the currency, a sign of the financial crisis the empire went through, too.

2.2. Campaigns against the Seljuks

Leaving behind the crucial domestic problems, Romanos headed a series of campaigns against the Seljuks. His first campaign (March 1068-January 1069) was attempted against the poor condition of the army. Romanos’ forces camped in Bithynia and Phrygia and only until October moved towards Syria, when they freed Hierapolis. From there, passing through the passes of Taurus, Romanos crossed Cilicia and Cappadocia to return at Constantinople. In the mean time the Seljuks plundered Amorion.8 The second campaign started in the spring of 1069. This time Romanos provided to take with him one of his political rivals, Michael Psellos, under the pretext that the latter should consult him during the campaign, but virtually in order to prevent him from plotting against the emperor during his absence. Through Dorylaion, the Byzantine forces reached Caesaria and Larisa of Cappadocia and from there on they ran over many times the region from Euphrates to Melitene. The emperor’s aim was to relief the border regions, mainly around the big urban centres, from the pressure of the Seljuks, who in the mean time had captured and plundered Ikonion.9

Realizing the difficulties and the poor results of the two earlier campaigns of his and indeed morally broken, in 1070 Romanos took the decision not to lead a new campaign, the conduct of which he appointed to domestichos ton Scholon Manuel Komnenos. The latter, although managed to reorganize the army and force discipline, was defeated by the Seljuks in Sebasteia and was captured. Altough his release a little later and the submission of the Seljuk leader that had captured him, it was very clear that Asia Minor had ceased to be under the absolute control of the imperial army.

That course of events made Romanos campaign anew against the Seljuks in the spring of 1071. This action of his was probably an act of despair rather than the result of wise consideration over the State strengths. The environment in the capital tried ceaselessly to undermine emperor’s position,10 while the army, although now better trained, still remained heterogeneous and ready to defect under any occassion.11

3. Captivity and fall

The crucial clash between the Byzantines and the Seljuks took place on the 26 of August 1071 at Mantzikert. The imperial army was crushed and Romanos IV himself was captured alive. Some ascribe the defeat on the betrayal of the commander of the Byzantine second line, son of John Doukas. The emperor himself fought bravely (a fact acknowledge even by the ill-disposed Michael Psellos), but he could not change the outcome of the battle.12

The news of Romanos’ captivity gave the chance to his political rivals to move on with his overthrow. Constantinople initially was in turmoil, until finally Eudokia took charge of power again, together with her first-born son Michael VII (1071-1078) and recalled from Bithynia caesar John Doukas. However, the latter, together with his son Andronikos, Psellos and a team of senators and the Varangian guard, overthrew augusta, forced her to become a nun against her will and confined her in a monastery in the Bosporus. In addition, they proclaimed Michael the only emperor and gave to the authorities the order to stop recognizing Romanos IV’s power (end of September 1071).

After the sign of a peace treaty with the Seljuk sultan, which left the Byzantine territories in Asia Minor almost intact, Romanos Diogenes left free and took the road back to Constantinople. He was quickly informed about the political turnabout in the capital and, by refusing to acknowledge the decisions taken in absentia and against Eudokias’ will, he was determined to reclaim his throne by force. However he met the reluctance or even the hostility of the military commanders in the East. Loyal to him remained only his compatriots the Cappadocians, Theodore Alyates and the Armenian Chatatourios, commander of Antioch. By raising an army from units that had escaped from the battle at Mantzikert, Romanos took position at Amaseia, in order to confront the forces sent against him from Constantinople. At the battle that followed Diogenes was defeated, but managed to escape in Cilicia. In the spring of 1072 he was besieged at Adana by Andronikos Doukas himself and forced to come to terms with the mediation of the metropolitans of Chalcedon, Herakleia and Koloneia.13

As agreed, Romanos was tonsured and, feckless from an attempt of poisoning him that preceded, he followed the army up to Kotyaion.14 There, despite the agreed terms and the promises of the three archbishops, who had guaranteed his physical integrity, he was blinded on the 26 of June 1072, probably under the orders of John Doukas. After this blunt action, the half-dead Romanos reached a few days later his place of exile, the island of Prote in the Sea of Marmara (Propontis), where he died on the 4 of August 1072. Augusta Eudokia buried him with all the luxuries, under her son’s permission, who was aloof of the decision for the blinding, according to the unanimous record of the contemporary historiographers.15

1. Brand, C.M. – Cutler, A., “Romanos IV Diogenes”, Kazhdan, A. (ed.), The Oxford History of Byzantium 3 (New York – Oxford 1991), p. 1807.

2. Büttner-Wobst, T. (ed.), Ioannis Zonarae epitomae historiarum libri XVIII 3 (Bonn 1897), p. 580.

3. Bekker, I. (ed.), Michaelis Attaliotae Historia (Bonn 1853), pp. 97-98; Τσολάκης, Ε. (ed.), Ioannes Scylitzes Continuatus (Institute for Balkan Studies 105, Thessaloniki 1968), pp. 121-122.

4. Bekker, I. (ed.), Michaelis Attaliotae Historia (Bonn 1853), pp. 99-100; Τσολάκης, Ε. (ed.), Ioannes Scylitzes Continuatus (Institute for Balkan Studies 105, Thessaloniki 1968), p. 122.

5. Büttner-Wobst, T. (ed.), Ioannis Zonarae epitomae historiarum libri XVIII 3 (Bonn 1897), p. 681; Bekker, I. (ed.), Michaelis Attaliotae Historia (Bonn 1853), p. 92.

6. Büttner-Wobst, T. (ed.), Ioannis Zonarae epitomae historiarum libri XVIII 3 (Bonn 1897), pp. 684-687; Τσολάκης, Ε. (ed.), Ioannes Scylitzes Continuatus (Institute for Balkan Studies 105, Thessaloniki 1968), pp. 123-125; Bekker, I. (ed.), Michaelis Attaliotae Historia (Bonn 1853), p. 101.

7. A characteristic example is the army casualties, when from the warm climate in the region of Antioch they crossed (during December) the passes of Cilicia on Tauros and from the rapid change of temperature men, horses and mules froze to death, forming a horrible spectacle along the road. See Τσολάκης, Ε. (ed.), Ioannes Scylitzes Continuatus (Institute for Balkan Studies 105, Thessaloniki 1968), pp. 133, 1-7.

8. Τσολάκης, Ε. (ed.), Ioannes Scylitzes Continuatus (Institute for Balkan Studies 105, Thessaloniki 1968), pp. 124-125; Bekker, I. (ed.), Michaelis Attaliotae Historia (Bonn 1853), p. 103-104; Büttner-Wobst, T. (ed.), Ioannis Zonarae epitomae historiarum libri XVIII 3 (Bonn 1897), p. 688.

9. Bekker, I. (ed.), Michaelis Attaliotae Historia (Bonn 1853), pp. 122-123; Τσολάκης, Ε. (ed.), Ioannes Scylitzes Continuatus (Institute for Balkan Studies 105, Thessaloniki 1968), pp. 133-134; Büttner-Wobst, T. (ed.), Ioannis Zonarae epitomae historiarum libri XVIII 3 (Bonn 1897), p. 692.

10. Τσολάκης, Ε. (ed.), Ioannes Scylitzes Continuatus (Institute for Balkan Studies 105, Thessaloniki 1968), p. 141.

11. Bekker, I. (ed.), Michaelis Attaliotae Historia (Bonn 1853), p. 146; Τσολάκης, Ε. (ed.), Ioannes Scylitzes Continuatus (Institute for Balkan Studies 105, Thessaloniki 1968), p. 143. Outside some native Byzantines, Romanos had with him a mosaic of ethnicities: Normans, Franks, Alans, Turks, Armenians, Iberians, Bulgars, Uzes and others.

12. The heroism of Romanos and his strategic weaknesses were discussed a lot in his age, as Psellos testifies, who rightly observes that Romanos was worth of praises for his fighting strength, but reproachable because he endangered himself fighting in the first line, instead of conducting the battle from the right position, something the Seljuk sultan marked as well.

13. Bekker, I. (ed.), Michaelis Attaliotae Historia (Bonn 1853), pp. 172-174. Attaleiates disagrees with the strategy Romanos followed. Instead of exploiting the debacle of the army and the return of Constantine Doukas in the capital when winter came and proceed through the interior of Asia Minor westwards, Diogenes drew his army in Cilicia. He made a mistake even when the following spring, instead of stopping Andronikos Doukas in Tauros, he preferred to withdraw inside the castle of Adana.

14. Bekker, I. (ed.), Michaelis Attaliotae Historia (Bonn 1853), p. 175.

15. Bekker, I. (ed.), Michaelis Attaliotae Historia (Bonn 1853), pp. 175-179. John Zonaras [Büttner-Wobst, T. (ed.), Ioannis Zonarae epitomae historiarum libri XVIII 3 (Bonn 1897), pp. 706-707], writing at a time when the Doukai were not any more at the political forefront, expresses his opinion that all that happened was under the orders of John Doukas while his nephew, emperor Michael, was totally unaware; according to the same historiographer, Michael VII was incapable of making a single right decision, let alone exercising imperial power.
     
 
 
 
 
 

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