1. Historical background
The campaign of caliph al-Mu’tasim (833-842) in 838 was one of the many military operations the Arabs organized against the Byzantine Empire from the 7th until the 11th century, aiming basically in weakening the empire and gaining control over Asia Minor and the West. However, the most decisive role, concerning the realization of this campaign, as well as the intense atmosphere in which the operation took place on behalf of the Arabs, was played by the victorious campaign of emperor Theophilos in 837, during which Sozopetra (Zapetra) was destroyed and attrocities were commited against the city’s population.1 Due to this fact and in combination to the Byzantine policy of supporting the Persian rebels under Bābak,2 al-Mu’ tasim wanted a rapid and dynamic military reaction. However, the problems he faced inside the caliphate, due to the Persian rebellion,3 postponed the fulfilment of his aim. Just after the Arab troops suppressed Bābak’s movement and captured its leader (this took place in September of 837 and Bābak was executed in January of 838), the Arab ruler was at last ready to turn with all his powers against the Byzantine Empire. In contrast to the previous campaigns, the attack was not aimed to the forts along the Arab-Byzantine border, but against great centres of the Byzantine defence, such as Ankara and Amorion. The former, apart from being the capital of the theme of Anatolikon, was the birthplace of the dynasty of Theophilos, something which satisfied the wish of the caliph for revenge.4
2. The campaign of al-Mu’ tasim in Asia Minor
2.1. The first movements of the two adversaries
On 5th April 838 the Arab caliph al-Mu’ tasim, leading a particularly large military force,5 left Samarra6 and camped near Tarsus, on the river Lamos. Wishing to attack the Byzantine Empire from many sides simultaneously, he divided his troops in two parts and then he ordered one of them,7 led by general Afshīn, of Persian origin, to unite with the troops of Amr al-Aqta’, emir of Melitene, and to invade areas of the theme of Armeniakon. As planned, Afshīn moved towards the region of Dazimon (today Dazmana of Turkey), southeast of Amaseia,8 where he encamped. The rest of the Arab forces9 invaded a few days later in western Cappadocia through the Cilician Gates: on 19th June their vanguard, led by the Arab general Ashinas and on 21st June the main force, led by the caliph. The news of the Arab invasion mobilized the emperor Theophilos, who started preparing his troops in May and in early June he left for Asia Minor.10 Having with him the tagmata under the domesticus of the scolae Manuel, the Persian army under Nasr/Theophobos11 and probably soldiers from the themes of Thrace and Macedonia,12 he initially encamped at Dorylaeum. His advisors urged him to evacuate Amorion, in order to prevent the bloodshed. Theophilos, however, having trust to his troops, rejected such a possibility, considering it an act of cowardice.13 In contrast, he chose to strengthen the defence of Amorion even more, sending there a part of his army, with Aetios, the strategos of the theme of Anatolikon,14 in charge. Next he moved towards Cappadocia and he encamped on river Alys.
2.2. The battle of Dazimon and the fall of Amorion
When Theophilos was informed of the presence of Afshīn in the area of Dazimon, he headed there with a part of his army.15 In the battle which followed (22nd July) the Byzantine troops were defeated and fled in disorder, whereas the emperor was almost captured, seeking refuge at Chiliokomon, north of Amaseia. There he tried to gather his scattered troops, while he ordered a military detachment under Theodore Krateros to head for Ankara, in order to protect the city from an eventual Arab attack. Nevertheless, the inhabitants had just abandoned the city, thus Krateros turned towards Amorion. Theophilos retreated at Dorylaeum, but soon he had to return to Constantinople, in order to belie the rumour he was killed in action and to face any attempt of usurpation of his throne.16 Meanwhile, around the 26th July and having already captured the fugitive inhabitants of the city, the troops of Ashinas reached Ankara. In the next two days he was met there by the troops of Afshīn and the caliph. The united Arab army plundered and destroyed the city17 and then headed for Amorion. The siege of the city started on 1st August and Amorion was finally taken (after treachery)18 by the Arabs on 12th or 13th or 15th August 838,19 despite the strong Byzantine forces defending the city and the diplomatic efforts of Theophilus from Dorylaeum or Nicaea,20 where he had, in the meantime, returned. The fall of Amorion was followed by its sack and almost total devastation, whereas many inhabitants were led to captivity. The rumour that Theophilos was planning to counterattack urged the Arab caliph to move towards Dorylaeum, but he met no resistance and returned to Amorion.
2.3. Withdrawal of the Arab troops
While al-Mu’ tasim was still in Amorion, organizing his next moves, in which even an attack against Constantinople was planned, the news of a new rebellion in the caliphate reached him, something which forced the caliph to suddenly interrupt his campaign. In order to rush his return, he followed a course through the desert, during which many prisoners died of thirst and exhaustion, whereas 6,000 men were decapitated. Finally the Arab army crossed the Cilician Gates and returned to Syria victorious.
3. Consequences
The greatest damage al-Mu’ tasim’s campaign of 383 afflicted was the fall and destruction of Amorion. In an administrative level this meant the temporary move of the capital of the thema of Anatolikoi at Polyvotos.21 But the psychological effect the campaign had to the subjects of the Empire was even more intense,22 especially to Theophilos himself, who, shattered by what happened in the birthplace of his dynasty, fell seriously ill.23 In an effort to ransom the prisoners, especially the senior officers and their families, the emperor sent an embassy to al-Mu’ tasim,24 offering him an important amount of money. The negotiations, however, were not successful and the prisoners remained in the hands of the Arabs. Forty two of them met martyrdom on 6th March 846 in Samarra, because they refused to become Muslims.
Apart from the fact that the defeat at Dazimon, the destruction of Ankara and the fall of Amorion were indeed great losses for Byzantium,25 they undoubtedly questioned the ability of the Byzantine troops to defend the lands of the empire from the Arab danger, which was now even more menacing. In connection to that, the iconoclastic politics of the emperor, to which his adversaries attributed his military failures since it did not guarantee the divine protection, was severed. In his efforts to reverse this difficult situation, Theophilos turned –as early as the end of 838- towards the states of the West. More particularly, he sent emissaries to Venice, to the Frank king Louis the Pious, as well as to the caliph of Spain ‘Abd al-Rahman II, asking their help in the struggle against the Arabs of the East.26
1. Byzantine sources mention that Sozopetra was the birthplace of the caliph al-Mu’ tazim. Vasiliev, A. A., Byzance et les Arabes, 1, La dynastie d’Amorium (820-867) (Corpus Bruxellense Historiae Byzantinae 1, Bruxelles 1968), p. 140, 141, but Treadgold, W. T., The Byzantine Revival 780-842 (Stanford 1988), p. 440, n. 401 considers this testimony a later legend, which was created to parallel the capture of Sozopetra in 837 with that of the birthplace of emperor Theophilos (Amorion) in 838. Hild, F. – Restle, M., Kappadokien (Kappadokia, Charsianon, Sebasteia und Lykandos) (Tabula Imperii Byzantini 2, Wien 1981), p. 287, believe this myth was created by the Byzantine historians in order to weaken the importance of the defeat of the Byzantines in Amorion, as well as the cause of the previous capture of the birthplace of the caliph by Theoplilos. In contrast, Άμαντος, Κ., Ιστορία του βυζαντινού κράτους3, 1 (Αθήνα 1963), p. 414, and Χριστοφιλοπούλου Αικ., Βυζαντινή Ιστορία 2: 610-867 (2Θεσσαλονίκη 1993), p. 204, accept this information of the Byzantine sources as credible. 2. Rosser, J., “Theophilus’ Khurramite Policy and its Finale: The Revolt of Theophobus’ Persian Troops in 838”, Βυζαντινά 6 (1974), p. 265. 3. The revolt of Bābak was aiming in promoting social reformations inside the caliphate. It lasted from 816 until September 837, when it was suppressed by the caliph al-Mu’tasim. 4. It is indicative that on the war flags and the shields of the caliph’s soldiers the word Amorion was written. 5. Vasiliev, A. A., Byzance et les Arabes, 1, La dynastie d’Amorium (820- 867) (Corpus Bruxellense Historiae Byzantinae 1, Bruxelles 1968), p. 146, calculates the force of the Arab army in 200,000 to 500,000 men, whereas Treadgold, W. T., The Byzantine Revival 780-842 (Stanford 1988), p. 297, in approximately 80,000 soldiers, escorted by a crowd of servants, merchants and pack animals. 6. The capital of the caliphate was moved from Baghdad to Samarra during the reign of the caliph al-Mu’ tasim. 7. According to Treadgold, W. T., The Byzantine Revival 780-842 (Stanford 1988), p. 299, this specific army numbered 30,000 men and included 10,000 Turks and all the army of Arab Armenia. 8. Hild, F. – Restle, M., Kappadokien (Kappadokia, Charsianon, Sebasteia und Lykandos) (Tabula Imperii Byzantini 2, Wien 1981), p. 79. 9. According to Treadgold, W. T., The Byzantine Revival 780-842 (Stanford 1988), p. 299, they numbered 50,000 men. 10. Treadgold, W. T., The Byzantine Revival 780-842 (Stanford 1988), p. 297-298. 11. Nasr took the name Theophobus after having been baptized and he is attested in the Byzantine sources under this second name. See more in Rékaya, M., “Mise au point sur Théophobe et l'alliance de Babek avec Théophile (833/834-839/840)”, Byzantion 44 (1974), p. 43-67. 12. Treadgold, W. T., The Byzantine Revival 780-842 (Stanford 1988), p. 298. 13. Bekker, I. (ed.), Theophanes Continuatus (Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae, Bonn 1838), p. 126, 3-8. 14. About the leaders of the army, Vasiliev, A. A., Byzance et les Arabes 1: La dynastie d’Amorium (820- 867) (Corpus Bruxellense Historiae Byzantinae 1, Bruxelles 1968), p. 147, 171, mentions protospatharios Theodoros Krateros, strategos (general) Theophilos, the droungarios Konstantinos Vavoutzikos and Vasoes. Belke, K. – Restle, M., Galatien und Lykaonien (Tabula Imperii Byzantini 4, Wien 1984), p. 65, only mention the first one, whom they consider to be the strategos of the thema of Voukellarioi. Treadgold, W. T., The Byzantine Revival 780-842 (Stanford 1988), p. 442, n. 408, only mentions Theophilos (as a protospatharios) and Vavoutzikos and rejects the assumption that Theodoros Krateros was in this phase sent to Amorion (he suggests that this happened later, after Theodoros Krateros went to Ankara, in order to defend the city from the approaching Arab attack). 15. According to Treadgold, W. T., The Byzantine Revival 780-842 (Stanford 1988), p. 299, this army numbered 40,000 men. 16. Vasiliev, A. A., Byzance et les Arabes 1: La dynastie d’Amorium (820- 867) (Corpus Bruxellense Historiae Byzantinae 1, Bruxelles 1968), p. 158-159, believes that the attitude of the Persian troops and the election of Nasr/Theophovos as an emperor was the reason which forced Theophilos to return to Constantinople in a rush. In contrast, Treadgold, W. T., The Byzantine Revival 780-842 (Stanford 1988), p. 301-302, Belke, K., Paphlagonien und Honorias (Tabula Imperii Byzantini 9, Wien 1996), p. 75, and Cheynet, J.-Cl., “Theophile, Theophobe et les Perses”, in Λαμπάκης, Σ. (ed.), Η Βυζαντινή Μικρά Ασία (6ος-12ος αιώνας) (Διεθνή Συμπόσια 6, Αθήνα 1998), p. 44-45, do not relate the two facts, but attribute the return of Theophilos to the Byzantine capital earlier to the plans of certain nobles to elect a new emperor. According to Rosser, J., “Theophilus’ Khurramite Policy and its Finale: The Revolt of Theophobus’ Persian Troops in 838”, Βυζαντινά 6 (1974), p. 269, it is very possible they wished to elect Nasr/Theophobus as an emperor. 17. The destruction of Ankara by the Arabs is completely ignored by the Byzantine sources. 18. According to the sources, a citizen of Arab origin from Amorion, who was previously captured by the Byzantines and had become a Christian, secretly revealed to the Arab caliph a point on the city wall which was recently been destroyed by the rain, but was thoroughly restored. Vasiliev, A. A., Byzance et les Arabes 1: La dynastie d’Amorium (820- 867) (Corpus Bruxellense Historiae Byzantinae 1, Bruxelles 1968), p. 168-169, as well as Treadgold, W. T., The Byzantine Revival 780-842 (Stanford 1988), p. 302 consider this information credible. 19. The first date is provided by Vasiliev, A. A., Byzance et les Arabes 1: La dynastie d’Amorium (820- 867) (Corpus Bruxellense Historiae Byzantinae 1, Bruxelles 1968), p. 170, and Χριστοφιλοπούλου, Αικ., Βυζαντινή Ιστορία 2: 610-867 (2Θεσσαλονίκη 1993), p. 206; the second by Rekaya, M., “Mise au point sur Theophobe et l'alliance de Babek avec Theophile (833/834-839/840)”, Byzantion 44 (1974), p. 64; the first and the second by Belke, K. – Restle, M., Galatien und Lykaonien (Tabula Imperii Byzantini 4, Wien 1984), p. 66; and the third by Treadgold, W.T., The Byzantine Revival 780-842 (Stanford 1988), p. 302, and Cheynet, J.-Cl., “Theophile, Theophobe et les Perses”, in Λαμπάκης, Σ. (ed.), Η Βυζαντινή Μικρά Ασία (6ος-12ος αιώνας) (Διεθνή Συμπόσια 6, Αθήνα 1998), p. 45. 20. Thus Vasiliev, A. A., Byzance et les Arabes 1: La dynastie d’Amorium (820- 867) (Corpus Bruxellense Historiae Byzantinae 1, Bruxelles 1968), p. 158, and Cheynet, J.-Cl., “Theophile, Theophobe et les Perses”, in Λαμπάκης Σ. (ed.), Η Βυζαντινή Μικρά Ασία (6ος-12ος αιώνας) (Διεθνή Συμπόσια 6, Αθήνα 1998), p. 45. Treadgold, W. T., The Byzantine Revival 780-842 (Stanford 1988), p. 302, reports that Theophilos returned to Dorylaeum via Nicaea. 21. Treadgold, W. T., The Byzantine Revival 780-842 (Stanford 1988), p. 304. 22. The memory of the sack of Amorion is discernible in many exemples of Byzantine vernacular poetry. 23. Byzantine sources attribute the aggravation of the health of emperor Theophilos and his death a few years later (20th January 842) to his sorrow for the fall of Amorion. This is most probably a legend. 24. In charge of the embassy was an officer named Vasileios. Vasiliev, A. A., Byzance et les Arabes, 1, La dynastie d’Amorium (820-867) (Corpus Bruxellense Historiae Byzantinae 1, Bruxelles 1968), p. 174, and Hild, F. – Restle, M., Kappadokien (Kappadokia, Charsianon,Sebasteia und Lykandos) (Tabula Imperii Byzantini 2, Wien 1981), p. 79, mention him as the patrikios of Charsianon, whereas Treadgold, W. T., TheByzantine Revival 780-842 (Stanford 1988), p. 303, and Cheynet, J.-Cl., “Theophile, Theophobe et les Perses”, in Λαμπάκης, Σ. (ed.), Η Βυζαντινή Μικρά Ασία (6ος-12ος αιώνας) (Διεθνή Συμπόσια 6, Αθήνα 1998), p. 46, as the tourmarch of Charsianon. 25. Treadgold, W. T., The Byzantine Revival 780-842 (Stanford 1988), p. 304-305, believes that, apart from the fall of Amorion, the campaign of 838 did not afflict any more loses to the Byzantines than any other ordinary Arab raid. He also considers that the successes of the Arabs do not necessarily mark any weakness of the Byzantine army, since the defeat was greatly caused by accidental events (e.g. even for the fall of Amorion the breach in the wall of the city was basically responsible). 26. The deliverance from the Arab menace eventually came thanks to the internal problems the caliphate faced after the death of al-Mu’ tazim in 842. |