1. Biography
The ancestry of Michael VIII Palaiologos originated from three Byzantine imperial families, the Doukai, the Komnenoi and the Angeloi, while both his parents belonged to the family of the Palaiologoi. He was born in 1224 or 12251 to the megas domestikos Andronikos Palaiologos and Theodora Palaiologina, daughter of the despot Alexios Palaiologos and Eirene Angelina (daughter of the emperor Alexios III).
Michael married Theodora, granddaughter of Isaac Doukas, brother of emperor John III Doukas Vatatzes. From his marriage he fathered seven children: his sons Manuel (died at childhood), Andronikos, Constantine and Theodore, and daughters Eirene, Anna and Eudokia. Michael VIII also had two daughters born out of wedlock―Euphrosyne and Maria.
2. Early career
After the successful campaign of emperor John III Vatatzes, whose troops captured many Macedonian cities in 1246, Andronikos Palaiologos was appointed commander in the West, with his seat at Thessaloniki, while his son Michael was given command of the cities of Meleniko and Serres. Thus began the career of the young officer, who remained in that office for six or seven years (1246/7-1253).
The death of John III Vatatzes (1254) found Michael Palaiologos, with the rank of grand konostaulos, commanding the foreign mercenaries in the army of Nicaea. He remained at this post probably until 1257-1258. His ambitions, however, caused suspicions to the new emperor Theodore II Laskaris. Fearful of the king, but also in order to promote his claim to the throne, in 1256 Michael Palaiologos―while commander of Bithynia― fled to the sultan of Konya and allied himself to the Seljuks.2 However, when the Tatar threat forced the Seljuks to seek help from the Byzantines, Michael had to return to the Empire and normalize his relations with Theodore II.
Michael’s situation changed in August 1258 with the death of Theodore II. John IV Laskaris, a minor, remained heir apparent to the throne, while the regency was taken over by George Mouzalon, who was particularly hateful to the aristocracy and soon afterwards was murdered, along with his brother, during a memorial service for Theodore II in the monastery of Sosandra. Michael, who had participated in the conspiracy against him, now took over as regent. Having already acquired fame as an excellent general and coming from one of the most illustrious families, he was particularly popular with the army and at the time he was definitely the most prominent personality in the Empire. His wife Theodora’s descend from the emperor John III Vatatzes also played a role.
The assumption of the office of regent opened for Michael the way to power. In September 1258 he was appointed megas doukas, two months later, on November 13, despot and on January 1, 1259 he was acclaimed as the young John IV’s co-emperor. He thus assumed power of the Empire, which at that time was in a very difficult position, facing grave external threats.
3. Restoration of the Empire
Michael VIII’s quick rise to power was due not only to his skills, which are undoubted, but also to political and diplomatic developments. A powerful anti-Byzantine coalition had been formed in the West, consisting of Manfred, king of Sicily, Michael II, despot of Epirus, and William II Villehardouin, prince of Achaia, supported by the Serbian king Stephen Uroš I. Already in 1258 Manfred had taken Corfu and Dyrrachion (Durazzo) on the coast of Epirus, a city only recently captured by Theodore II Laskaris, while the Serbs had taken Skopje, Prilep and Kitsevo. The threat against the Empire of Nicaea was imminent.
The war against this alliance was the first great test of Michael VIII’s reign; on the other hand, its favorable outcome significantly reinforced his authority. In the autumn of 1259 the army of Nicaea, commanded by John Palaiologos, Michael’s brother, trounced the opposing coalition’s heterogeneous army on the plain of Pelagonia.3 There was now no land power that could prevent the restoration of Byzantium.
The only possible external threat against Michael’s policy was Venice, which had reaped the most benefits from the conquest of Constantinople in 1204 by the Crusaders and was an all-powerful maritime power. For this reason Michael allied himself with Genoa, Venice’s rival. The alliance was concluded in March 1261 at Nymphaion and obliged Genoa to furnish military assistance against the Venetians, in exchange for exemption from all taxes within imperial territory and the creation of its own trading posts in all the important ports.
The great event, the recapture of Constantinople, a fixed aim of Nicaean policy, came about suddenly in the summer of 1261, when general Alexios Strategopoulos entered the unguarded capital at the head of a small number of troops. Michael VIII made a formal processional entry into the city on August 15, to the enthusiastic acclamations of the assembled populace. In September 1261 the patriarch crowned Michael VIII and his wife Theodora in the Hagia Sophia. His 3-year-old son Andronikos, as heir apparent to the throne, was acclaimed co-emperor. The legitimate emperor John IV was elbowed out of the ceremonies and a few months later Michael had him blinded and banished.4
The Empire’s restoration, nevertheless, spelled new dangers and difficulties, while maintaining this position demanded more troops and means than those already at the disposal of the ”provincial” empire of Nicaea. The empire was surrounded by many enemies and an attack from the West, by the forces that wished to restitute the Latin Empire, was expected at any moment. Michael fell back on diplomacy and proved to be shrewd and wonderfully efficient.
4. Foreign policy
4.1. Western policy
Byzantium’s most dangerous adversary was the kingdom of Sicily, but the latter’s plans for conquest depended on support from the Pope. During the reign of Manfred, who was not on good terms with the Curia, Michael VIII could restrain the former’s ambitions with relative ease. However, when Charles of Anjou ascended the throne of Sicily and joined forces with Baldwin II, deposed Latin emperor of Constantinople, William II Villehardouin, Serbia and Bulgaria, the situation became extremely dangerous for Byzantium. It was then that Michael broached the subject of the union of Churches, which the Pope, after the experience of 1204, preferred over a new conquest of Byzantium. For some years Michael VIII played this card successfully, but Pope Gregory X placed him in a quandary: either a union or he himself would not be in a position to restrain Charles of Anjou any more. Meanwhile, John of Thessaly, the bastard son of Michael II, despot of Epirus, also joined forces with Charles. Thus, all of Byzantium’s enemies united under a single banner. Under these circumstances, Gregory X’s threats produced results and so in the Council of Lyons in June 1274 the union of Churches was signed. The primacy not only of the Church of Rome, but of its doctrine as well was recognized and thus a temporary relief came about.
A new challenge for Michael VIII emerged when Martin IV, a Frenchman under the immediate influence of Charles of Anjou, ascended the papal throne. In the meantime, as it proved to be the case, the union remained essentially a dead letter. With papal support, in 1281 Charles of Anjou and the titular Latin emperor Philip, son of Baldwin II, concluded in Orvieto a treaty with the Venetian Republic, with the aim of “reinstating the Roman Empire usurped by Palaiologos”.5 Indeed, Martin IV condemned Michael VIII as a schismatic and forbade Catholic rulers from having any contact with him. The Balkan rulers―John of Thessaly, Milutin, George I Terter―joined this coalition. The Byzantine emperor agreed with Peter III, king of Aragon, to make a surprise attack against Charles. To that end, he placed substantial funds at Peter’s disposal, while Byzantine agents agitated the inhabitants of Sicily against the authority of the Angevin foreigners. At the moment when the Byzantine emperor’s difficulties had peaked, a rebellion broke out (March 1282) in Palermo―the “Sicilian Vespers”―which put an end to the Angevin domination in Sicily. The storm that was gathering for 20 years over Byzantium was driven away thanks to the unrivalled diplomatic skills of Michael VIII.
Byzantium scored major successes at sea, recovering Euboea and many other islands, with the result that the Byzantine fleet once again became master of the Aegean Sea. In the Peloponnese the Byzantines not only managed to consolidate their position, but they also began expanding at the expense of the principality of the Morea. The Byzantine emperor allowed William II Villehardouin, who had been taken prisoner at the battle of Pelagonia, to return to Achaia, but not before swearing fealty to the emperor and receiving the rank of megas domestikos, and he was also obliged to cede to Byzantium certain important castles―Monemvasia, Mistra, Mani and Geraki. It was the beginning of the restoration of Byzantine authority in the Peloponnese, which was to become the Empire’s healthiest and financially strongest part.
Michael VIII has also linked his name to an important document, a decree dated 1272 by which he attempted, without success, to abolish the autocephalous status of the Serbian and Bulgarian churches and make them suffragans of the Archbishopric of Ochrid. In 1272, while in conflict with Bulgaria, Michael VIII recaptured the cities of Anchialos and Mesembria, which had been a bone of old Byzantine-Bulgarian contention. In Epirus, where the imperial army was less than successful, the peace treaty that had been concluded was cemented by the marriage of Nikephoros, the despot Michael II’s legitimate son and heir, to a niece of Michael VIII. This treaty formally put an end to all the ambitions of the state of Epirus in the struggle for Byzantine succession.
Of particular sensitivity, within the framework of Byzantium’s western policy, were the relations to the Italian maritime republics. After Genoa suffered a string of defeats in the war against Venice, Michael VIII changed his political alignment. In June 1265 he concluded a treaty with the Venetians by which he conferred to Venice not only the old, but certain new privileges as well. However, due to the fact that the Venetians were hesitating to ratify the treaty, Michael VIII renewed the treaty with Genoa and, in 1267, apart from the old privileges he allowed the Genoese to settle at Galata. Fearing a Genoese monopoly of the Levant, in April 1268 the Venetians finally consented to ratify the agreed treaty with the Byzantine Empire, without this act annulling Genoa’s privileges. Although this policy ensured Byzantium’s safety against the two naval powers, it also enmeshed it in the webs of the Italian maritime republics, from which Byzantium was unable to disentangle itself to the bitter end.
4.2. Eastern policy
Michael VIII was also forced to take into consideration the developments in the East, where the most important political players at the time were the Tatars of the Golden Horde in South Russia, Hulagu Khan’s Mongols in the Near East and the Mamluks in Egypt. Because of the contacts of the Mamluks of Egypt with South Russia, whence came to them members of their own race, the maritime route controlled by the Byzantines was important to the Mamluks. However, Michael’s friendly relations with Hulagu Khan made it difficult for him to cooperate both with the Mamluks and the Tatars of the Golden Horde, who were hostile to the Mongols of the Near East.
The Tatars allied themselves to Bulgaria and in 1264 and 1271 launched destructive raids within Byzantine territory, forcing Michael into seeking a treaty with them. So in 1272 he made a pact of friendship with the Tatar leader Nogai, who was very influential with the Golden Horde and was in a position to quash every anti-Byzantine action in Bulgaria. Apart from rich gifts, Michael VIII gave to Nogai as his wife Euphrosyne, his own illegitimate daughter.
In this way Michael succeeded in creating a cordon of allies of his own to surround the ring of powers hostile to the empire, in order to control the empire’s enemies: Hulagu Khan’s Mongols put pressure on the sultanate of Konya, Nogai’s Tatars on Bulgaria, while an allied Hungary lay behind the backs of the Serbs; this alliance was cemented by the marriage of the heir to the throne, Andronikos, to Anna, daughter of Stephen V.
5. Domestic policy
Michael carried out a wide restoration program for the churches, monasteries and public foundations that had fallen into decay during the time of the Latin empire of Constantinople.6 At the same time, he repaired the walls, both landward and maritime, and tried to reinforce the capital’s population which had decreased dramatically. For his works he is praised in a series of laudatory speeches by Manuel Holobolos, who refers to Michael’s accomplishments as confirming the sobriquet “New Constantine” that he had bestowed upon him.7
Michael VIII introduced important changes in the institution of co-emperor by issuing a decree in 1272.8 His son and co-emperor Andronikos Palaiologos received wide-ranging powers, never before enjoyed by co-emperors. In this way Michael wished to ensure that Andronikos would be safe from his brother John Palaiologos, who was very popular at the time and could threaten the succession.
However, the great diplomatic successes scored by Michael VII, under very difficult circumstances and at the expense of many painful concessions on the part of the Empire, created domestic problems. Initially he incurred the public’s wrath by his atrocious behavior towards John IV Laskaris, the legitimate heir to the throne, whose rights he had sworn to defend as regent. The patriarch Arsenios Autoreianos, who saw himself as the young emperor’s champion, excommunicated Michael VIII. The latter managed, with considerable effort, to remove the elderly anchorite; Arsenios was replaced as patriarch by Germanos III, who strengthened the emperor’s image and appears to have been the first to name him “New Constantine”. Later Michael VIII received absolution from the patriarchal excommunication by Arsenios’ second successor, Joseph I, but part of the clergy remained loyal to the deposed Arsenios. Very soon a party of Arsenites was formed, which persistently reacted to the emperor and the new ecclesiastical hierarchy.
To this discontent was added the reaction of part of the public opinion to the emperor’s unionist policy. When Michael VIII, by signing the union of Churches at Lyons, asked the Orthodox Church to recognize papal primacy, the whole country was disturbed. The situation became even more difficult when patriarch Joseph I’s refusal to recognize the Union, which resulted in the patriarchal throne forcibly changing occupants. The new patriarch was John XI Bekkos, originally an opponent of the union who later accepted it. A deep rift developed and the Empire was torn between two hostile parties. The Byzantine people, whose anti-Latin feelings had been exacerbated, rose against the emperor. Contrary to Michael, who saw the Union as a necessary means of his foreign policy, the clergy and part of the people looked upon it as an ecclesiastical measure impinging on the Orthodox faith and they did not recognize in the external threat, mainly that of Charles of Anjou, any extenuating circumstances for the emperor’s unionist policy. The situation came to such a boiling point that harsh persecutions were initiated, while the imperial family itself was torn apart: the role of pivot around which the opposition against Michael VIII rallied was played by the emperor’s elder sister Eirene (Eulogia).9
Hatred against the unionist emperor spread to the Greek successor states as well. Nikephoros, despot of Epirus, rose against Michael VIII, while the sebastokrator John of Thessaly, an old enemy of the emperor, appeared in the guise of defender of Orthodoxy: indeed, in 1278 he convened a church council in which Michael VIII was condemned as a heretic.10
Michael VIII died at the village of Pachomios, Thrace, on December 11, 1282. His son and heir Andronikos II, viewing the union of Churches as his father’s great sin, ordered Michael buried secretly, at night, in an unmarked grave of the local village cemetery. Later, however, fearing that the remains might be desecrated, he ordered his father exhumed. The remains were not taken to Constantinople, but instead to Selymbria, where they were interred, without a funerary service, in the monastery of the Savior. It is characteristic that Michael’s name is missing from the Synodicon of Orthodoxy, which was compiled in 1439 and contains the names of all the Byzantine emperors.11 It is a typical example of a Byzantine Damnatio memoriae.