1. Family

Pharnabazus was an official of royal descent in the Achaemenid Empire.¹His birth is dated to before 444 BC.² Between 414 and 412 BC he inherited the office of satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia from his father Pharnaces II.³ He had a legitimate brother, whose name is unattested,⁴ while another, illegitimate, brother and his uncle, Susamithras, are also mentioned.⁵ He was married to Apame (387 BC),⁶ daughter of king Artaxerxes II (404-351 BC) and had three sons: Artabazus III,⁷ later satrap of Phrygia (362-330 BC), Oxythres and Dibictus.⁸ His heir, Ariobarzanes (387-362 BC) belonged to the same family; it is unclear, however, whether he was his legitimate brother or an older legitimate son from an unknown spouse.⁹ He also had an illegitimate son by one Parapita.¹⁰ His family controlled estates around Dascylium, where he had his palace on a naturally fortified position, surrounded by hamlets and paradises.

2. Deeds

Since 413 BC, Pharnabazus has participated in Darius II’s (423-404 BC) efforts to re-annex the coastal areas of Asia Minor to the Achaemenid Empire and make them pay tribute. He formed an alliance with the Spartans and was active against the Athenians during the Ionian War (412-405 BC) launching military operations in the Hellespont. His successive defeats at the hands of the Athenians and Alcibiades forced him to come to terms, but the settlement was annulled by Cyrus the younger, who arrived in Asia Minor in 407 BC as karanos.¹¹ In 405 BC, taking advantage of the power vacuum in Asia Minor following the defeat of the Athenians, he captured areas on the borders of his realm with Phrygia, where he installed exiles from Miletus.¹²

In 404 BC he warned the legitimate king Artaxerxes II of Cyrus’ plans to rebel. Cyrus drove him out of his satrapy in 401 BC.¹³ In that year Pharnabazus sided with Artaxerxes at the Battle of Cunaxa, and soon after, as a satrap again with increased powers extending to the borders of Pisidia, he repeatedly faced the mercenary force of the Ten Thousand.¹⁴ During the war between Sparta and Persia he bore most of the brunt of Spartan military operations. Dercylidas was the first to launch a campaign against him; Pharnabazus managed to negotiate truce in two consecutive occasions (in 399 and 398 BC), but could not avoid the loss of Aeolis. Soon after (397-395 BC), independently and sometimes in cooperation with Tissaphernes (his superior and satrap of Lydia) he faced Agesilaus, who had allied himself with the defector Spithridates and the Paphlagonian ruler Otys; Agesilaus repeatedly invaded Pharnabazus’ realm and sacked Dascyleum. Ultimately, he failed to inflict a decisive defeat on his opponent, and an understanding was reached.¹⁵ By lavishing bribes on politicians, Pharnabazus managed to turn the Greek cities against Sparta and incited the Corinthian War (395 BC).¹⁶ He restored his rule over Aeolis and, in cooperation with Conon and the Athenians, he rebuilt the Persian fleet and won a decisive victory over the Spartans in the naval battle of Cnidus in 394 BC, although he failed to capture the cities of Abydus and Sestus.¹⁷ In the following year he launched a campaign in Laconia. He continued to fight alongside his allies, the Athenians, until he was recalled to Susa in 388 BC, where he got married to Apame. The sources describe this recall as a promotion, but attribute his removal from Asia Minor to Artaxerxes’ spectacular change of policy in favour of Sparta and Antalcidas.¹⁸ Pharnabazus also led two of Artaxerxes’ abortive campaigns against Egypt in 386-383 and in 374-373 BC. He was recalled in 373 BC and replaced by Datames. He probably passed away soon after, for there is no subsequent mention of his name.¹⁹

3. Assessment

Pharnabazus, the most actively engaged in Greek affairs Persian of his era, was seen as the quintessential Oriental despot, totally given to luxuriousness. The difficulties one faced when seeking an audience with him had become proverbial.²⁰ Various judgements are made about him in the sources: Xenophon and Plutarch depict him as a loyal and brave warrior, but also a competent statesman and diplomat. Other sources, though, emphasize his greediness, the facility with which he resorted to bribery and intrigue to deal with his adversaries, his envy of the Greeks and his famous grudges. His is charged with the murder of Alcibiades, his adversary in the Ionian War, who was a guest in his realm (404 BC). He clashed with Iphicrates over the supreme command of the Egyptian campaign, while his well-known antagonism with Dercylidas and Lysander led to the latter’s falling into disfavour at Sparta.²¹ At any rate, he maintained excellent relations with most of his Greek allies, especially with the Spartan Mindarus during the Ionian War and with the Athenian Conon during the war between Persia and Sparta. The fact that he also cooperated and maintained friendly relations with the Syracusan Hermocrates, who was himself exiled and found himself with no ships after the destruction of the Peloponnesian fleet at the battle of Cyzicus (410 BC), reveals a certain disinterestedness.²²

The willingness of the cities of the Hellespont to defect from Athens, the removal of Lysander by the Spartans following his request, his reluctance to install Persian garrisons and the constant support he offered to his friends and allies, often in contravention of official Persian policy, reveal that Pharnaces had earned the trust of his allies and his Greek subjects.

His political acumen and his military and diplomatic skills are beyond doubt. Among his greatest virtues was his ability to vigorously support his policies with all available means and the facility with which he inspired confidence in his interlocutors. He passionately supported Darius II’s anti-Athenian policy, until he foresaw it would lead to an impasse. He remained loyal to Darius’ heir Artaxerxes II in a critical time of great upheavals in the empire (401 BC). On a number of occasions he was forced to come to terms with Greek generals in order to secure his position, and was willing to pay great sums to this end. He managed, however, to foresee the dangers behind Sparta’s and Lysander’s hegemonic stance, and succeeded in eliminating him politically. Pharnabazus was the first one to realize the necessity of launching a Persian offensive at sea and on Greek soil in order to eradicate the danger posed by Agesilaus. By entering into an alliance with Athens and Conon he managed to thwart this threat by leading the Persian fleet into the Aegean and penetrating as far as the shores of Laconia, for the first time after the Battle of Salamis (449 BC) at Cyprus. He was in fact the main architect of Persian ascendancy over Asia Minor and the Aegean following the Peace of Antalcidas (387 BC).²³ On internal front he not only managed to retain his realm intact notwithstanding recurrent raids, but succeeded in increasing it spectacularly, by expanding the borders of his satrapy to the north edges of Aeolis and Troas, thanks to the mercenary army of Zenis and Mania. His satrapy was organized like a miniature kingdom; it was subdivided into smaller fiefdoms or ‘satrapies’, like those of Zenio and Mania at Troas and of Ratines in the Gordium²⁴ area, which he used to launch recurrent raids into Pisidia, Mysia, Bithynia and Paphlagonia.²⁵ He frequently used Greeks who were guests in his court as agents to further his policies, mainly prominent statesmen, like Apollophanes of Cyzicus, who intervened in his dispute with Agesilaus, or exiles, like the members of the embassies he sent in 412 BC to Sparta. Apparently he could speak Greek, if it is true that his celebrated discussion with Agesilaus took place without the aid of interpreters. This would be perfectly normal for the scion of a noble family installed in the Hellespont area for several decades. On the contrary, his relations with the Persian officials were not exceptional. There was constant antagonism between him and Tissaphernes. It is clear that Cyrus’ mission in 407 BC is connected with the inability of the two satraps to join forces against the common threat posed by the Athenians.²⁶ This rivalry intensified during the war against Sparta. Eventually, Pharnabazus’ intercession with Artaxerxes II at Susa in 398/397 BC and his complaints against Tissaphernes marked the beginning of the end for the satrap of Lydia.²⁷

Sometimes his choices were antipodal to official Persian policy, especially when in 408 BC he signed a ceasefire with the Athenians and escorted their embassy to Gordium. In 395 BC he stated to Agesilaus that, had he not been given supreme military command, he would have rebelled and joined the Spartans.²⁸ Notwithstanding, it is clear that Artaxerxes respected him immensely, judging from the important offices that were bestowed upon him.